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Abstract-The Ottoman Empire developed from a frontier 
principality to become the most powerful empire in the world 
by 1566. It conquered lands and countries in three continents, 
covering and area of approximately 978,000 square miles at 
time of Süleyman the Magnificent. The most significant 
conquest, without a doubt, was the capture of Constantinople 
in 1453 by Mehmet the Conqueror, which marked the end of 
the Eastern Roman Empire. Historians characterize this event 
as the end of middle ages. Many historians agree that the 
Ottomans’ success depended to a large extent on their ability 
to amply supply provisions and weapons to their soldiers. 
They also provided plentiful food for their animals which were 
the main transport means. In other words, although soldiers, 
Janissaries and cavalry, won battles, the supply chain and 
logistics of the Ottoman Army made it possible. To the best of 
the knowledge of the author of this manuscript, there is very 
little research on how militaries of the middle Ages supplied 
and logistically supported their soldiers and animals. This 
paper provides an example of how one of those militaries 
accomplished it. This research is based on published books 
and articles by prominent historians and covers the period of 
1300 to 1566. It concludes that the basic principles used by the 
Ottoman Army for their supply chain and logistical activities 
are still valid today and used by excellent modern supply and 
logistics systems. 
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This paper presents a study of the supply chain and logistics 
systems of the Ottoman army. The period under study is 
from 1300s, approximate date of the establishment of the 
Ottoman principality, to the death of the sultan Süleyman I 
(1566), also known as Süleyman the Magnificent, or the 
Law Giver. Many historians consider Süleyman’s reign as 
the apogee of the Ottoman Empire. At which time the 
Empire had reached the limits of its expansion with lands 
in Europe, Asia, and Africa. End of Süleyman’s reign was 
also the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire; a 
decline that lasted hundreds of years. Many historians also 
agree that the supply chain and logistics systems of the 
Ottoman army was a major factor in its successes in 
conquering wide expanses of lands in three continents and 
winning wars. However, Ottomans had many failures and 
defeats, especially after 1566, largely blamed to the 
ineffectiveness of its supply and logistics systems. 
 The paper is organized in eight sections, and three side 
bars to provide more information about three very 
important institutions mentioned in the paper. The second 
section provides a brief summary of the history of the 
Ottoman Empire for the selected period. The third is a 
summary of the military organization of the army. The 
fourth section discusses the supply system of the army. The 
fifth section focuses on the logistics system. The sixth 
section describes the process of marching and halting in a 
campaign. The seventh section is a brief description of the 
Ottoman military marching band Mehteran as a moral 
support group in battle and in peace times, and the final 
section presents some observations and conclusions. 
 
2. A brief history of the Ottoman (Osmanlı) 
Empire (1300-1566) 
 
Historical documents about the beginnings of the Ottomans 
(the Europeans corrupted the word Osmanlı to Ottoman) 
are scarce. Historians generally rely on documents written 
much later. However, it is generally accepted that the 
family that established the Ottoman dynasty belonged to the 
Kayı branch of Günhan arm of Oğuz Turks [1]. The Kayı 
people entered Anatolia in the second part of the13th 
century as part of the massive nomadic Turcoman 
migration from Central Asia. This migration started 
because of harsh climatic and economic conditions in 
Central Asia. Turcomans first came to Iran and Eastern 
Anatolia. After the defeat of the Seljuks by the Mongols in 
1243 they migrated farther west, eventually settling on the 
frontier between the Byzantine and Seljuk Sultanate [2]. 
Under the leadership of patriarch Ertuğrul bey (chief) they 
established a principality (beylik) in Söğüt in north-west 
Anatolia as the Seljuks their suzerain. 
 After Ertuğrul’s death his son Osman Gazi (holy warrior) 
(c. 1290-1324) became the leader. At the time, central and 
western Anatolia was partitioned by several principalities, 
all of which were Turkic origin and Muslim [3]. Ottoman 
principality became a state after Osman’s 1302 defeat of 
Byzantine troops in Baphaeon. This victory increased 
Osman’s fame resulting in gazis from various parts of 
Anatolia gathering under his banner. The ideal of Gaza, 
continuous holy war and expansion of Islamic land, formed 
the foundation of frontier society and culture [2]. 
 
 However, Ottoman sultans were pragmatists; they 
followed a rational strategy when it came to dealing with 
Christian or Muslim states. Gaza (holy war) was neither the 
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ultimate objective nor it was a strategy to destroy Christian 
and Jewish societies but to subjugate them. They were more 
complex than simple holy wars, sometimes Muslims and 
Christians joined forces and shared the booty in raids [4]. 
Sometimes, Ottomans established alliances with Christian 
rulers against other Christian states as well as against 
Muslim states. At the same time Ottomans became the 
protectors of the Orthodox Christians. They guaranteed the 
lives and properties of Christians and Jews. These 
communities were free to exercise their religions and live 
according to their traditions. However, they were required 
to pay a poll tax to the state. 
Furthermore, Ottomans pursued a policy of volunteer 
submission of non-Muslims before resorting to warfare. As 
a result, the Ottoman state became a multi-religion, multi-
ethnic, and multi-cultural society. An example to the 
success of this tolerant policy is the Greek frontier lord 
Mihal Gazi’s voluntary conversion to Islam and 
cooperation with the Ottoman military [2]. Other Greek 
(Evrenos Gazi) and Serb nobilities (Malkoçoğlu; Serbian 
Malković), who both became Muslim, played significant 
roles in Ottoman campaigns. Also, the relationship with 
regional kings or potentates were not always warlike. These 
sometimes took the form of intermarriages between 
families of rulers. For example, Sultan Orhan Gazi (1326-
1362) married Theodora, the daughter of John V. 
Cantacuzenus, a claimant to the Byzantine throne [2]. 
Another wife of Orhan was the daughter of Byzantine 
Emperor Andronikos III (1328-1341) [1]. Bayezid I (the 
Thunderbolt, 1389-1402) married Princes Olivera Despina, 
sister of the Serb despot Stefan Lazarevic (1389-1427) [1]. 
Furthermore, Lazarevic allied with his brother-in-law by 
fighting alongside him in the battles of Nicopolis (1396) 
and Ankara (1402) [5]. Of course, probably the most 
famous and influential wife was the wife of Süleyman the 
Magnificent, Russian slave Roxalana (Hürrem Sultan). 
 Upon the death of Osman, his son Orhan Gazi (1324-
1362) became the leader of the Ottomans. Orhan’s reign 
included a series of important conquests, one particularly 
important was the annexation of Anatolian principality 
Karesi (1344) whose lands provided a crossing point at 
Dardanelles from Asia to Europe [3]. Ottoman incursion 
into Europe began with the capture of Gallipoli (Gelibolu, 
1354) and Adrianople (Edirne, 1361); this could be 
considered as significant as conquering Constantinople [6]. 
In addition, they transported Turcoman nomads to the 
newly occupied lands where they founded Turkish villages, 
thereby establishing a firm presence on the European soil 
[2].  
 
 Despite some occasional setbacks, expansion of 
territories both in Anatolia and the Balkans by conquest 
continued during the reign of Murad I (1362-1389) who 
conquered Sofia, Bulgaria, southwestern Anatolia, and 
Ankara. Murad I died in the battle of Kosovo. His son 
Bayezid I took over and continued the campaigns. 
However, Ottomans experienced a major defeat inflicted by 
Timur (1336-1405) in the battle of Ankara and Bayezid I 
was taken prisoner. This was an existential threat to the 
Ottoman state. What followed was more than ten years of 
struggle among the sons of Bayezid I for the throne. 
Eventually Mehmed I (1413-1421) succeeded by defeating 
his brothers. During his reign, Mehmed I had to deal with 
several revolts both in Anatolia and the Balkans, his success 
in suppressing them was largely due to well-trained and 
supplied Janissaries [2]. 
 
 Three years of crisis resulted from the death of Mehmed 
I. The Janissaries and the ulema (members of the learned 
class, educated in Islamic law) supported Murad II (1421-
1451) against his uncle Mustafa’s claim to the throne [2]. 
Although Murad II experienced some defeats such as 
failure to capture Belgrade, between 1430 and 1444 he 
made some important conquests including Thessaloniki, 
Smyrna (Izmir), and Smederovo. Murad II abdicated in 
favor of his 12 year old son Mehmed II after signing treaties 
with his European and Anatolian rivals in 1444 [2]. 
 
 Ecumenical Council of Ferrara-Florence ended in 1439 
with the union of the Greek and Latin churches. Although 
this was a short lived union, the important result for the 
Ottomans was the resurgence of a desire to launch a crusade 
against the Turks [7]. In the same year of Murad’s II 
abdication, a crusading army composed of troops from 
Hungary and Transylvania, crossed the Danube and 
marched towards the Ottoman capital Adrianople (Edirne).  
 
 Upon this looming threat viziers urged Murad II to lead 
the army to save the Ottoman state. Ottomans defeated the 
crusaders sealing the fate of the Balkans and Byzantine 
Empire. In 1446 Grand Vizier Çandarlı Halil engineered a 
Janissary revolt, removed Mehmed II from the throne and 
brought back Murad II to power [2]. In his second reign, 
Murad II turned his attention to the Balkan vassals who 
revolted during the 1444 crisis. He successfully subdued 
these vassals thereby completing the Ottoman Empire’s 
recovery from the disaster of 1402. Mehmet II (1451-1481) 
became the sultan after Murad’s death in 1451. At first he 
focused on establishing friendly relationships with his 
western enemies such as Venice, Byzantium, Transylvania, 
and Serbia. 
 These developments created the conditions for him to 
turn his attention to the conquest of Constantinople. The 
city was captured on May 29, 1453 after a siege of 53 days. 
This conquest created shockwaves across Europe and 
marked the end of Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire [8]. 
The city was renamed as İstanbul and became the capital of 
the empire. 
 
 After the conquest of İstanbul, Mehmed the Conqueror 
continued to expand Ottoman territories, conquered 
Peloponnese in 1460, engaged in a long war with Venetians 
from 1463 to 1477 which ended with Venetian defeat and 
loss of Shkodër (Scutari), Lemnos, and lands in the 
Peloponnese. In the east, he conquered major ports on the 
Black sea, and made Crimea a vassal state, practically 
gaining the control of Black Sea [8].  
 
 Next, he turned his attention to the southwest Anatolia, 
where a powerful rival was posing a threat to the Ottomans: 
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Uzun Hasan, the ruler of Iran and eastern Anatolia, was 
trying to gain the control of the principality of Karaman as 
well as the entire Anatolia through Venetian assistance. In 
1473 Mehmed’s army inflicted a crushing defeat upon 
Uzun Hasan and ended the principality of Karaman [8]. 
Then he turned on Venice to punish it for her collaboration 
with Uzun Hasan. Mehmed was victorious again, as a result 
Venice agreed to pay an annual indemnity of ten thousand 
ducats [2]. Mehmed II died in 1481 on the way to another 
campaign. At the time of his death, the Ottoman Empire 
extended from the lands between the Danube and Sava in 
Europe, Peloponnese in the southern Europe, to the Black 
Sea coast in the northern Anatolia and to the Euphrates 
valley [3]. 
 
 A Janissary revolt and a struggle for the throne between 
Bayezid and Cem, the two sons of Mehmed II, followed his 
death. With the support of Janissaries Bayezid II claimed 
the throne [8]. At the beginning of his reign Bayezid II 
(1481-1512) reversed most of his father’s unpopular 
policies, then to please his troops and consolidate his 
authority launched a campaign against Moldavia. He was 
successful, Ottomans captured Akkerman and Kilia in 1484 
[2]. 
 Bayezid II signed a peace treaty with Hungary in 1503. 
At this time Ottomans were facing another threat in the east. 
Shah İsmail, head of Safavids of Iran, proclaimed that he 
would make Anatolia part of his empire. In 1511 powerful 
nomadic Turcoman, known as kızılbaş (red head, due to the 
red head gear they wore), revolted, with support from Shah 
İsmail, posing a serious threat to the Ottoman rule. At this 
time Bayezid II was aged, ailing and unable to handle the 
threat. Sensing that his end was near, his three sons were 
engaged in a power struggle. In the end, the youngest son 
Selim won the support of the Janissaries and forced his 
father to abdicate in 1512 [2].  
 
 Selim I (1512-1520) started his reign by eliminating his 
brothers to secure his claim to the throne. Then turned his 
attention to Safavids. He marched against this significant 
threat and soundly defeated Shah İsmail’s forces at the 
battle of Çaldıran in 1514 [8]. Selim’s next target was the 
other powerful threat: Mamluks. In August of 1516 he 
completely destroyed Mamluk forces near Marj Dabiq, near 
Aleppo. He continued to the south capturing Aleppo, 
Damascus, and Egypt. Probably, the most significant result 
of this campaign was that he received the title “Servant of 
Mecca and Medina,” the holy cities of Islam [2]. Yet 
another, may be more important, result was his receipt of 
caliphate from the Abbasid caliph as well as the standard 
and cloak of the Prophet, becoming caliph and leader and 
protector of Muslims all over the world [9]. At the time of 
his death (1520) the size of the Ottoman Empire was twice 
the size he inherited. 
 Succession of Süleyman I (1520-1566) to the throne was 
peaceful since he was the only son of Selim. His first major 
victory was the capture of Belgrade in 1521. Next year 
Ottomans conquered Rhodes. In 1526 he launched a 
campaign against Hungary and defeated the Hungarian 
army at Mohacs and captured the Hungarian capital Buda 
[3]. Right after this victory, he had to return to İstanbul to 
deal with several uprisings in Anatolia. In 1527 Ferdinand 
of Austria took Buda. A crisis involving Hungarian throne 
brought Süleyman back to Hungary, recaptured Buda, and 
laid siege to Vienna, but was not successful. The conflict 
ended in 1533, an agreement was reached with Archduke 
Ferdinand and the Hungarian king Szapolyai; they would 
rule their respective territories as Ottoman tributaries [3]. 
 
 The rest of his reign was occupied with alternating 
campaigns in the east against Safavids and in the west, 
against Austria and Hungary. Many conquests were made 
in the east, including Tabriz, Basra, Georgia, Tripoli, 
Nakhchivan and Erivan, and Ethiopia. However, most of 
Süleyman’s campaigns were in the west. Some of the major 
conquests included the islands of Naxos, Andros, Paros, 
and Santorini, annexation of Hungary, conquest of 
Valpovo, and Siklos in Croatia. The Ottomans’ siege of 
Malta and Corfu ended in failure (1565). An important 
development in the Ottomans’ naval affairs was the 
assignment of Barbary corsair Khaireddin Barborossa 
(Hayrettin Barbaros) to the admiralty of the Ottoman Navy 
in 1533. Barbarossa not only conquered Tunisia and 
Algeria for the Ottomans, but also won a major victory at 
Preveza in 1538 against allied navies of Pope Paul III, Holy 
Roman Emperor and King of Spain Charles V, Ferdinand 
of Austria, and Venice under the command of Andrea 
Doria. The consequence of this victory was the conversion 
of the Mediterranean into an Ottoman lake [9]. 
 
 Süleyman’s last campaign was in 1566 against the city of 
Szigetvár, he died a day before the capture of the city. At 
the time of his death, the Ottoman Empire was at its zenith; 
its lands extended from Mediterranean coast of North 
Africa, including Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt, to the 
south east Iraq including Baghdad and Basra, Syria, Mecca, 
Medina, and Yemen, in the east to Iran, in the northeast 
Georgia, to the north and northwest Vassal states of 
Crimea, Moldova, Transylvania, and Wallachia, and finally 
in the west, to Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Croatia, 
and Greece. The zenith was also the beginning of a long 
decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
3. Military organization of the Ottoman 
Army  
 
In the early years, the Ottoman army consisted of cavalry 
of tribal nomadic warriors, Gazis, and azabs (literally 
bachelors) were volunteer light infantry from Turkish 
villages. Azabs were supported by their communities. The 
effectiveness of these troops was limited, especially in 
siege warfare; hence, around 1325 Ottomans formed an 
army of yayas (foot soldiers) and müsellems (cavalry) all 
paid from the treasury and recruited from Turkish villages 
[10]. After the mid15th century, they were assigned to 
support services such as road building and repair, 
transportation, fortress construction, and ship building [1]. 
 
 As the Ottomans expanded their territories the need for a 
larger military force became clear. The result was the 
establishment of a standing army of kapıkulu (salaried 
palace troops) and tımar holding cavalry (See the sidebar 
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Tımar System) around the 1370s. Kapıkulu consisted of 
prisoners of war and devşirme boys (Christian boys 
gathered through child levy system) (See sidebar 
Devşirme). Kapıkulu had two divisions: infantry, including 
Jannisaries, and cavalry, Sipahs. Kapıkulu soldiers were 
called slaves of the Porte, “however, they were neither 
ordinary slaves, nor freemen.” [11] It should also be 
pointed out that Ottoman sultans considered themselves as 
slaves of Allah [2]. 
 
3.1  Kapıkulu infantry  
   
3.1.1  Acemi Ocağı (Hearth of novices).  
According to the Ottoman law soldiers were entitled to own 
young Christian prisoners of war they captured as slaves. 
Another law required one out of five sturdy captives to be 
given to the Palace [10]. These youngsters were first 
circumcised and converted to İslam then placed in Turkish 
peasant families to learn Turkish and Muslim traditions and 
culture.  
 
 Another source for the Acemi Ocağı was the devşirme 
system (See the sidebar Devşirme System). Boys between 
ages of 8 and 18 collected from Christian villages also 
followed the same route as captives [2]. However, the 
smartest ones were directly sent to the various palace 
schools for education. Those who completed their 
internship in Anatolia or in the Balkans were transferred to 
Acemi Ocağı with a daily stipend of one akçe (Ottoman 
monetary unit). Again, those who exhibited high 
intelligence were, instead, sent to one of three palace 
schools for education. In Acemi Ocağı they received 
military training, they were also assigned to various jobs 
such as public construction projects, ship yards, and 
gardens of palaces [15]. When vacancies occurred in 
kapıkulu ranks they were filled from Acemi Ocağı. This 
institution was the supply source for kapıkulu soldiers and 
future military commanders and top bureaucrats. 
 
3.1.2  Yeniçeri Ocağı (Janissary Hearth) (Yeniçeri: new 
soldier).  
 
This unit was established in 1363 together with Acemi 
Ocağı. It was the first standing infantry army in Europe 
[16]. They were organized into ortas (corps). The number 
of ortas increased through time reaching 196 during the 
reign of Bayezid II and remained constant until their 
abolishment in 1826. The number of Janissaries also varied 
through the years; on average it was 10 thousand, but 
reached 16 thousand during the reign of Süleyman I [2]. 
They were paid two akçes a day every three months and 
bonuses; the salary of a Janissary increased with service. 
They also received clothing, and the food they purchased 
was subsidized by the state [10]. Originally, they were not 
allowed to marry, however, this rule was changed later. 
When they retired, they received a decent pension and 
families of the fallen soldiers were taken good care of by 
the state. Janissaries trained regularly; three days a week in 
the use of various weapons and accompanied the Sultan 
during campaigns. Their peacetime duties included 
firefighting and policing the city [1]. 
 
 
TIMAR OR DİRLİK SYSTEM 
The main purpose of the dirlik system was to provide 
financial support to provincial cavalry and 
government officials in lieu of a salary. Although it 
was called the tımar system, actually, there were 
three classes of tımar: has, zeamet, and tımar; these 
were parts of the dirlik. Dirlik and tımar are 
sometimes used interchangeably. Has lands had 
annual income of hundred thousand akçes or more. 
The size depended on the status of the recipient. For 
example, has assigned to grand viziers had an income 
of 1.2 million [1]. Also, sultan, and his immediate 
family members (mother, wife, daughters, and 
sisters) would have has lands. Sultan’s has income 
went to the state treasury. Another group that 
received has was viziers and provincial governors. 
Lands with an annual income of between twenty and 
hundred thousand were called zeamet and assigned to 
high ranking commanders. Lands with annual 
income of between three thousand but less than 
hundred thousand were assigned to provincial 
cavalry according to their rank and bravery [1]. 
 Provincial cavalry (sipahi) received tımar land in 
return for military service. Tımar holding did not 
mean ownership, only the right to collect taxes from 
peasants they were supposed to pay the state. A 
timariot would lose his holding if he failed to perform 
his duties or exhibited cowardice. Government 
officials would also lose their holdings if they lost 
their position. 
 The main obligation of a timariot was to join the 
army during campaigns and bring a prescribed 
number of cebelis (retainers) with their required 
weaponry, all financed by the timariot [5]. When a 
campaign was ordered, the cavalry gathered first 
under the local then the regional commander’s 
banner. The number of retainers was determined 
based on the income of the land; one fully armed 
horseman for each 3,000 akçe income [2]. The 
weaponry of the timariots consisted of a coat of mail, 
mail coif, bow, arrows, javelin, shield and a slightly 
curved sabre [5]. In peace time timariots had the 
duties of maintaining law and order in their 
neighborhoods. Has and zeamet holders were also 
required to maintain a cavalry force and send them to 
war commensurate with the income of the land 
holdings. 
 Timariots consisted of Muslim Turks and the 
Christians of Byzantine Slav origin. In 1430s 18 
percent of all tımars in Albania and 17 percent of all 
tımars in Tirhala district of Greece were in the hands 
of Christian sipahis. For a Christian to be eligible to 
hold a tımar, he must be of military origin, and he 
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3.1.3  Cebeci Ocağı (Hearth of Armorers). 
 
This was one of the technical branches of Janissaries, it was 
also a very important part of the supply chain and logistics 
of the army. They were in charge of making, repairing, 
maintaining, storing weapons and transporting them to 
battle, including bows, arrows, rifles, gun powder, muskets 
as well as equipment for digging trenches. Cebecis were 
organized in 38 regiments and divided into four specialized 
units: weapon manufacturers, repairmen, gunpowder 
specialists, and combat equipment makers [10] with a roster 




3.1.4  Topçu Ocağı (Hearth of Cannoners)   
 
A second technical unit of the army was Topçu Ocağı. This 
branch of kapıkulu consisted of five specialized units:  
 
1.  Topçular (Gunners) 
2.  Top dökümcüler (cannon casters) 
3.  Top arabacıları (artillery wagoners) 
4.  Humbaracılar (bombardiers) in charge of making 
bombshells cast from iron or bronze. 
5. Lağımcılar (miners or sappers) were tasked to dig 
tunnels leading to the walls of a fortress being sieged; 
they would place explosives to destroy fortress walls. 
       
3.2  Kapıkulu Sipah(i) (Palace Cavalry) 
 
Like the Janissaries, this military unit was the Sultan’s 
personal salaried cavalry. It was more prestigious than 
Janissary troops. Their members were selected from among 
Janissaries who demonstrated exemplary service, graduates 
of the palace school Enderun (See sidebar Enderun), and 
from schools of other palaces, according to their talent, 
merit and age. Sipahs were organized into six regiments; 
their numbers varied around 8 thousand, but exceeded 11 
thousand in Süleyman’s last campaign [1]. They 
accompanied the sultan in campaigns and were responsible 
for protecting the sultan [10].  In peacetime sipahs were 
assigned to bureaucratic jobs. These units were called sipah 
to distinguish them from sipahis, provincial cavalry. 
 
3.2.1  Provincial Forces 
 
3.2.1.1 Tımarlı Sipahi (Tımar holding cavalry) 
 
As explained in the sidebar, the tımar system included three 
types of land holdings: tımar, zeamet, and has. They were 
all assigned to soldiers and government officials in lieu of 
salary and they were all obligated to join the army in times 
of war with their retainers. They collected taxes from 
peasants as their income, taxes peasants normally paid to 
the state. Depending on the size of the land holding, they 
had to bring with them a certain number of fully armed, 
mounted, and trained cebelus (retainers) to the campaign; 
one retainer for every 3 thousand akçe income if the land 
was in Anatolia and 5 thousand if it was in Europe. These 
forces constituted the largest segment of the Ottoman army 
[5]. Their numbers varied through the years but no reliable 
sources exist about exact numbers; historian Murphey 
must have proved himself loyal to the sultan; in 
conquered Christian states military class fief holders 
were given tımars and became sipahis. Some tımar 
holders were soldiers of slave origin from the Sultan’s 
household [5]. During the reign of Süleyman I timariot 




After the terrible defeat at the battle of Ankara in 
1402, Ottoman expansion and conquests stopped 
and with it the flow of prisoners of war. A law was 
enacted by Murad II (1421-1451) to institutionalize 
the process of devşirme (child levy). This process 
was applied every three, four, or seven years 
mostly in Balkan countries. When the Janissary 
commander made a request and the sultan approved 
it, officials would travel to preselected areas to 
collect youngsters between the ages of 8 and 18 [1]. 
According to the law, the process included some 
strict rules to be followed. According to these rules, 
only Christian boys were to be collected; the only 
exception was Bosnians who earlier converted to 
Islam. Jewish, Russian, or Gypsy boys were 
exempt, but Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, 
and Croats were preferred [13]. Also exempt were 
families with only one boy. Only one boy per forty 
households could be collected. Families of these 
boys were exempt from some taxes. Girls were not 
subject to devşirme.  
 The law clearly defined the characteristics of the 
boys to be collected: from well known, respectable 
families and sons of priests, who were good looking, 
healthy, medium height, and with no physical 
problems. Boys who were extremely short or tall, 
orphans, artisans, circumcised, and those who spoke 
Turkish were not collected [13].  
When collection officials arrived at a location, people 
were notified and asked boys of between 8 and 18 
years old to come to a central location with their 
fathers and priests and bring their baptismal 
certificates. Officials then examined the documents 
and selected the boys that met the requirements and 
recorded very detailed relevant information in two 
separate ledgers, one of which was kept by the 
collection official and the other was given to the  
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estimated the total number of tımar holders and their 
cebelus as about 89,608 in 1527 [12].  Another historian, 
İnalcik had an estimate very close to this figure [2]. 
 
3.2.1.2 Auxiliary Forces 
 
Auxiliary forces were probably the least understood, and 
largely ignored troops of the Ottoman army. Their numbers 
actually exceeded the standing corps but they remained in 
their shadow [10]. Ottoman army had significant help from 
some auxiliary forces in their campaigns. At the time of 
Süleyman I these auxiliary troops numbered 30,180 [17]. 
There was a wide variety of these forces; the most 
important ones are listed below. 
 
(a)  Tatars.  
 
Tatars were a very effective combat group utilized by the 
Ottomans; they were Turkic-speaking peoples who 
converted to İslam in the 14th century. They were superb 
horsemen and archers. There were two groups of Tatars in 
the Ottoman service both light cavalry. The first group 
came to Anatolia with the Mongol invasion and settled in 
Eastern and Central Anatolia. Some of them later relocated 
to the Balkan lands [14]. The other group consisted of 
troops sent by the Crimean Khans to support the Ottoman 
army in campaigns. In their three hundred years of service, 
the Crimean Tatars contributed more to the Ottoman 
military than did any other of the ethnic group [18]. Their 
main service was in carrying out forward probing raids 
behind enemy lines. The main objective of these raids was 
to relieve pressure on Ottoman army while at the same time 
disrupting the enemy access to all potential sources of food 
and forage [12]. 
 
(b) Akıncılar (Raiders).  
 
These were the light cavalry consisting of only Turks 
operating on borderlands. They would march a couple of 
days ahead of the army for reconnaissance and establish the 
security of roads. They served the Ottoman state in 
exchange for the war booty [12]. Their numbers changed 
through the years; they numbered 50 thousand during the 
reign of Mehmed II and more than 50 thousand in 
Süleyman’s time [1], [12]. 
 
(c)  Deliler (Crazies).  
 
These were also light cavalry operating on borderlands 
consisting of mostly Turks but also converted Bosnians, 
Serbs, and Croats. They were known for their 
extraordinary bravery and fearlessness in attacking 
enemies.  
 
(d)  Azabs (Bachelors).  
 
They originally formed the first line of the Ottoman army 
on the battle field and therefore the first to come into 
contact with the enemy, later they were assigned to 
fortress duties. 
 
(e)  Cerahors/Serahors (irregular enlisted soldiers).  
 
Originally, cerahors/serahors were paid soldiers recruited 
from frontier Muslims and Christians in times of total 
mobilizations; every four or five households had to provide 
one soldier with weapons and provisions [10]. Later on they 
had become a support group, recruited only from Christian 
populations. They were in charge of opening and repairing 
roads, clearing forests, draining swamps, digging trenches, 
and transporting army’s equipment [1]. 
 
4. Supply chain of the Ottoman Army 
 
The Ottoman state had a very efficient and effective supply 
chain and logistics system for its army compared to its 
contemporaries in Europe and Asia. They also had most of 
the challenges today’s supply chain and logistics systems 
face. The most important task of the Ottoman supply chain 
was the provisioning of the kapıkulu soldiers, horses of 
sipahs, and animals that carried the army’s all sorts of 
supplies for a period of up to six months. 
 
 The logistics system faced the challenge of delivering 
what is needed, where it is needed, and when is needed. The 
supply chain also faced challenges such as determining the 
number of supply depots to set up and where to locate them 
(distribution centers, DCs, in modern world); how much 
food, weapons, gun powder, and equipment to store at these 
DC’s and how and when to restock them (inventory 
official who would be escorting the boys to İstanbul 
[2].  
 Upon their arrival, they were examined again, 
their identities were confirmed, circumcised, 
converted to İslam, and given Turkish names. 
Exceptionally bright and good looking lads were 
sent to various palace schools for education, the rest 
was sent to live and work in Turkish peasant 
families, learn Turkish and İslamic culture and 
customs. Those who were collected from Anatolia 
were sent to the Balkans and Balkan collections to 
Anatolia. When there were vacancies they were 
transferred to Acemi Ocağı.  
 Devşirme system started to break down towards 
the end of 16th century. One of the main reasons was 
admittance of the sons of kapıkulu soldiers, 
commanders and high level bureaucrats, and 
Muslims, usually through bribery, making 
devşirmes less important for filling the ranks of the 
kapıkulu [3]. Another reason could be a general 
resistance to foreigners’ rising to very high levels of 
the government [14]. 
 From the conquest of Constantinople to the end of 
Süleyman I’s reign 34 of the grand viziers out of 38 
were devşirmes (i.e. slaves). Some of them were 
appointed more than once [1]. 
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management); how many pack animals and their kinds, and 
carts will be needed, and how many had to be rented; when 
and where to use alternative delivery modes, such as over 
land, river, or sea (transportation planning). Finally, how to 
perform all these functions at the minimum possible cost.  
 
 One big difference between the Ottoman supply chain 
and logistics systems and the modern ones was that they did 
not operate in a free market economy; state frequently 
determined the prices at which merchants and peasants 
must sell foodstuff; also they levied special taxes to be paid 




4.1  Procedure for launching a campaign 
 
Once the sultan decided to launch a campaign he would 
convene a war council consisting of grand vizier, 
şeyhülislam (top religious leader), viziers, commanders of 
kapıkulu, top level bureaucrats, scientists, and experienced 
military officers. After hearing witnesses and reports about 
the hostile activities of the potential enemy and opinions of 
the participants, the sultan would ask their decision. 
Inevitably, the council would decide for war. Finally, 
şeyhülislam was asked if the decision was consistent with 
the rules of şeria (the Islamic law), upon his approval war 
would be declared onto the enemy [21]. A critical issue 
considered during the deliberations was the shortage or 
abundance of wheat, rice, and barley in the Ottoman lands. 
  
 One of the most significant aspects of Ottoman 
campaigns was that the state bureaucratic organization was 
an integral part of the war effort; it would accompany the 
army to the battle front, including the top bureaucrats. This 
was necessitated because of the critical role the 
bureaucracy played in the supply and logistics of the 
Ottoman army [22]. “The critical importance of the 
bureaucratic structure which intervened to meet supply 
demands even before they were yet sensed or even foreseen 
by forces in the field was critical to the success of the 
Ottoman military enterprise. Military administration and 
general bureaucratic skills form the most hidden (and 
therefore underrated) dimension of Ottoman military 
strength.” [12]. 
 
4.2  Acquisition & flows of funds 
 
The next step would be defterdar‘s (head of the treasury) 
calculation of the amount of money and reserves required 
to be in the war chest. One of the main sources of campaign 
financing was the transfers from the Inner Treasury. These 
were not regular contributions and they were made at the 
sultan’s discretion. Major portion of these funds were used 
to purchase equipment and provisions for the kapıkulu [12]. 
 
 In the Ottoman state population was divided into two 
main groups: the askeri (military and administrative class), 
they were tax exempt, and the reaya, consisting of peasants, 
merchants, tradesmen, and artisans who paid taxes [1]. The 
Ottoman state had various tax and revenue sources but the 
greatest amount of tax revenue, 48 percent of the total 
budget, came from the poll-tax Christian population paid; 
ENDERUN 
Enderun is a Persian word meaning “inside,” 
specifically, for the Ottomans “inner section of 
the sultan’s palace.” When Orhan Gazi (1324-
1362), and his son Murad I (1362-1389) after 
him started to organize the military, they also 
started a palace organization. Bayezid I (1389-
1402) and Mehmed I (1413-1421) further 
developed it to its splendor. The Ottoman palace, 
Topkapı, had three segments: enderun, birun 
(outside), and harem, living quarters of sultan 
and his family. Enderun is used also to refer to 
the palace school. The objective of Enderun was 
to educate and train sultan’s slaves for the highest 
bureaucratic and military ranks with absolute 
loyalty to the sultan; in that sense, it could be 
considered as part of the supply source for 
manpower of the Ottoman military and 
bureaucracy. Enderun was one of a kind, there 
was not any institution like it anywhere in the 
world at the time.  
 As mentioned in the paper and side bar 
Devşirme System, young Christian boys 
captured in wars and collected from Christian 
families would go through internships. 
Internships were for working in agriculture and 
learning Turkish and Muslim traditions and 
culture in Turkish peasant families for at least 
three, at most eight years. After this internship, 
they would go to acemi ocağı where they were 
assigned to various work projects, they received 
a stipend. Then, they would go through another 
evaluation and selection. While bright ones are 
sent to one of the palace schools or Topkapı 
Palace, the rest were enrolled in Janissary corps 
[2]. 
 There were three secondary palaces of the 
sultan where acemis received further education; 
these were prep schools before Enderun. 
Curriculum in these schools included Turkish 
and Moslem culture as well as sports for physical 
and mental development of the students. After 
the completion of their education and depending 
on need, they would go through another 
evaluation and testing; intelligent and skilled 
ones were sent to Enderun as palace pages, 
others were placed in kapikulu sipah corps [19]. 
 Education in Enderun progressed in stages. 
There were six odas (rooms) in increasing order 
of rank and prestige. Pages’ stipends also 
depended on this rank and all of their needs were  
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European lands provided 81 percent of all poll-tax revenues 
in the later part of the 15th century [23]. Another major 
revenue source was the tributes paid by the Christian vassal 
states.  
 
 However, the treasury would not be able to cover the total 
cost of war, therefore, additional sources of revenue were 
needed. For this, the government would levy avarız, an 
extraordinary temporary tax to supplement the war budget 
in obtaining food for men and animals [21]. Kapıkulu 
soldiers would buy foodstuffs they needed from the army 
with their salaries; however, prices charged to soldiers were 
significantly below the purchase cost. Consequently, the 
difference was paid from the state treasury, and the 
proceeds would be used to purchase replenishments [24].  
 The largest portion of the war expenditures was the 
salaries, bonuses, and rewards paid to kapıkulu soldiers and 
frontier fortress guards. The rest of the war budget was 
spent for buying food for men, barley and hay for animals, 
weaponry and equipment [24]. At the end of a campaign 
surplus provisions, if any, would be sold to the populace at 
the same fixed prices they were purchased [12].   
 
4.3  Supply of Manpower 
 
As explained above and in side bars Devşirme System, 
Tımar system, and Enderun, these institutions were the 
three main sources of bureaucrats, commanders, viziers, 
grand viziers, grand admirals, kapıkulu soldiers, and 
provincial cavalry for the Ottoman army. 
 
4.4  Information Flows  
 
Tatars and akıncıs acted as the reconnaissance units of the 
army. They would ride to the enemy territory one or two 
days ahead of the main forces to continuously collect and 
supply vital information to the army command, such as 
identifying vulnerable targets for attack. When they 
captured enemy soldiers they interrogated them for 
information. With this information commanders could 
make better decisions as to the optimal mix of cannons and 
other siege equipment to deploy. For effective 
reconnaissance they had to move very fast, and to 
accomplish this, Tatars would have several horses in tow 
[12]. 
   
 Another component of the information system was the 
menzilhane network, which was also part of the supply 
chain and logistics system. There were two types of 
menzilhanes: one for official communication and one for 
storing foodstuff and supplies; storage menzilhanes will be 
discussed in the logistics section.   
 
 The Ottoman Empire extended to three continents and 
covered 335,000 square miles by the death of Mehmed II in 
1481 and increased to 978,000 square miles by the end of 
Süleyman I’s reign. [25]. Communicating with the far 
reaches of the empire effectively and efficiently was a 
crucial challenge for the Ottomans, especially during a 
campaign.  Communication menzilhanes were established 
for meeting this challenge. They were exclusively for 
official state communications between the center of the 
government and provincial governors, kadıs (judge and 
met by the sultan. In addition to receiving 
education, they all performed various services to 
the palace and the sultan. Pages started their 
education in the first two odas, which were of equal 
rank. Upon completing their education in these 
odas, they were evaluated again; those who 
excelled in performance were transferred to one of 
the next three odas, the rest were placed in sipah 
corps [1]. 
The curriculum in consisted of five areas: 
1. Islamic knowledge: Qur'an, lessons on religion, 
Arabic, Islamic law, history of prophets.  
2. Humanities: Turkish language and literature,  
Persian language and literature, poetry,  
arithmetic, geometry, algebra.   
3. Fine Arts: Music with instruments, 
ornamentation, calligraphy, military and civil 
music. 
4. Physical training, sports, and military skills: 
Horsemanship, use of combat weapons such as 
swords, maces, spears and arrows and sports 
activities such as wrestling, weight lifting. 
5. Vocational training: Maintenance and 
preparation of clothing, craftsmanship, leather 
works, construction, ornamentation, jewelry, 
preparation of various medicines and ointments 
and strength pastes. 
 
 Those who had special interests could get 
additional education in those areas. One of the 
principles of Enderun was strict discipline and 
order. Not every student could finish the entire 
curriculum and they would be assigned to sipah 
corps. Promotions were strictly based on 
knowledge, skills, and performance, no one 
received special treatment. Students’ lives were 
strictly programmed; they would get up in the 
morning about two hours before the sunrise, bathe, 
perform morning prayers, have breakfast, then 
attend classes and performance of various duties, 
lunch, dinner, evening prayers, and sleep. They 
lived as bachelors, did not have any outside contact, 
and lived in the palace until they were twenty-five 
or thirty [2]. 
 It is interesting to note that, female slaves of the 
sultan, there were 400 of them in 1475, went 
through a long period of education and training 
similar to what pages received in Enderun, plus 
sewing, embroidery, dancing, singing, playing 
musical instruments, puppetry or story-telling 
according to their capabilities. Most of the Palace 
girls went as wives to the palace pages when they 
left the Palace for outside appointments [2]. 
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administrator) in towns and frontiers. In the early days of 
the Ottoman state there was the ulak system; ulaks were 
Tatar couriers delivering important documents to regional 
governors, kadıs and all levels of government offices. In 
addition to the documents they carried, they were given a 
sultanic or vizirial courier order authorizing him to change 
their horses wherever and however they could.  
 
 However, in time ulaks started abusing their authority; 
they were inflicting a great deal of suffering on the reaya. 
Consequently, the system was abolished. [26], [27]. 
Instead, menzilhanes were established along the three major 
routes both in the East and the West. Distances between 
menzilhanes were not equal, they depended on geographic 
and terrain conditions, however on average they were 35-
40 kilometers [28]. Couriers would change horses and if 
necessary, stay the night, and eat free of charge at a 
menzilhane. Town or towns in the vicinity of a menzilhane 
were responsible to acquire, care and maintain sufficient 
number of horses; kadıs supervised them. Menzilhanes 
operated year around and 24 hours a day. Number of horses 
at these locations and the number of menzilhanes were 
increased temporarily during campaigns [27]. 
 
4.5  Acquisition & supply of foodstuffs 
 
Although it was called an extraordinary tax, there were 
three types of taxes under avarız; nüzul, sürsat, and iştira. 
All three were levied for the food supply of the army. Nüzul 
could be considered as a direct contribution to the treasury. 
It was certain amounts of foodstuffs, mostly flour and 
barley, households were required to give to the 
government; the other two were purchases. Sürsat required 
people along the campaign route to bring and sell to the 
army all sorts of foodstuffs at fixed prices at predetermined 
halting places. İştira was the law for the army to purchase 
a variety of foodstuffs at locally fixed market prices [24], 
[29]. 
 
 All the food acquired through this system was brought to 
storage menzilhanes. It is clear that the Ottomans acquired 
food items in an orderly and organized way. One of the 
main concerns was the fair treatment of the reaya; so much 
so that foraging or taking anything without paying was 
prohibited, violators faced with a possible death penalty 
[29].  
 
 When a decision was made to launch a campaign, orders 
were issued to kadıs of the towns along the route of the 
march to supervise the collection of the quantities required 
by avarız and deliver to storage menzilhanes [30]. 
Similarly, foods for animals, such as barley and hay would 
be brought to menzilhanes and stored. Months before the 
onset of a major campaign large stocks of provisions were 
also made at strategic fortresses close to the battle field 
[17]. It should be noted that the army’s supply of food for 
men was only for the salaried kapıkulu troops; the total 
number of soldiers to be fed and supplied daily was about 
19 to 24 thousand. Provincial soldiers, timariot cavalry, 
were responsible for their own provisions; they had their 
own kitchens for feeding their soldiers [5]. Food supply for 
animals was also only for those owned by the army; 
timariot cavalry, and owners of rented animals were 
responsible for feeding and care of their animals.  
 
 The Ottoman Empire was known for its meticulous 
planning for acquisitioning food for its soldiers and army 
animals. When a war was imminent, all exports of grains 
were prohibited. The Ottomans knew troop morale and 
discipline was directly influenced by the degree their 
nutritional and dietary needs were met [12]. Main food 
items were bread, flour, hardtacks, bulgur, rice, mutton, 
beef, and chicken. Each kapıkulu soldier was entitled to two 
loaves of bread (1.3 lbs. each) per day. Rice was the basic 
food because of its durability [17].  On a campaign march, 
army was accompanied with sheep and cattle purchased  
 
along the campaign route [12]; about 750 sheep were 
slaughtered daily to supplement the diet of kapıkulu 
soldiers [31]. Sheep-breeders/drovers (celeps) were 
responsible for supplying the soldiers with meat, mainly 
mutton, acquired from the Balkans, Moldavia and 
Wallachia and sometimes from the nomads of Anatolia 
[30]. In addition, other food items such as honey, butter, 
corn, yogurt, and chicken could be purchased at halting 
points from orducu esnafı (craftsmen and tradesmen). 
 Like some other institutions of the Ottoman 
Empire, Enderun system degenerated through 
time and finally was closed in 1909. It can be 
safely said that Enderun achieved its objective of 
educating and training slaves of the sultan for 
high level bureaucratic and military assignments.  
 Tayyar-Zade Ata, an Ottoman historian and 
poet, a graduate himself, lists in his five volume 
of the history of Enderun, 60 grand viziers, 3 
şeyhülislams and 23 grand admirals of the 
Ottoman Navy, who were the graduates of 
Enderun. There were also 19 grand viziers and 13 
grand admirals who were educated and trained in 
other parts of Topkapı [20]. To understand the 
significance of these numbers we have to 
understand the power of a grand vizier. Mehmed 
the Conqueror described the grand vizier as 
follows: 
“Know that the grand vizier is, above all, the 
head of the viziers and commanders. He is 
greater than all men; he is in all matters the 
sultan’s absolute deputy. In all meetings and 
in all ceremonies the grand vizier takes his 
place before all others.” [2]. 
 It is clear that, for hundreds of years, the 
Ottoman Empire was run by former Christian 
slaves and graduates of Enderun; they were so 
powerful that a few of them even deposed the 
reigning sultan. 




 When the sultan was the commander in chief in a 
campaign a broad variety of palace staff, such as doctors, 
surgeons, clerks, and artisans would join the campaign to 
serve his needs and the needs of kapıkulu soldiers. Orducu 
esnafı was a different support group serving all soldiers. 
This group consisted of artisans, craftsmen, merchants, and 
tradesmen to sell a whole variety of items, services, and 
food to soldiers. When a decision was made to launch a 
campaign, orders would be issued to kadıs of cities and 
towns on the march route as well as to kadıs of major cities, 
including İstanbul, Bursa, and Edirne to organize orducus 
of prescribed trades; the order would include the number 
and specialty of master artisans and tradesmen needed and 
the number of tents (i.e. stores, stands) they should set up. 
For example, 154 master artisans belonging to 23 İstanbul 
guilds joined Süleyman the Magnificent’s Austria 
campaign in 1532 [33]. 
 
 Kadıs would work with representatives of guilds to select 
the members to be included in the orducu group. Each guild 
would decide who would be joining the campaign and how 
much money they should have for buying the materials they 
would be using or selling. The necessary capital would be 
contributed by the guild members and members of related 
guilds who were not joining the campaign. The result of 
these preparations was the setup of a market at each halting 
point that met practically any and every need of a 
contemporary soldier. In a way orducus can be considered 
as a form of outsourcing the provisioning of the army. 
 
4.6  Supply of weapons, gunpowder, raw 
materials, and equipment 
 
As mentioned earlier, Cebeci Ocağı was in charge of 
making, repairing, maintaining, and storing weapons, 
including bows, arrows, rifles, gun powder, muskets as well 
as equipment for digging trenches. In peacetime, these were 
normally kept in storage at the barracks of the kapıkulu. 
During a campaign they would be carried to the battle 
ground using camels, mules, and wagons [1]. Weapons and 
equipment were distributed to the Janissaries only at the 
battle field and were collected after the battle was over.  
  
 Casting of cannons, cannon balls, bombshells, and 
explosives for destroying fortress walls was the 
responsibility of Topçu Ocağı [1]. Within their territories, 
the Ottomans had ample sources of raw materials to 
manufacture cannons and cannonballs (copper, iron, and 
lead), and gunpowder (saltpeter, sulfur, charcoal, and fuel 
wood); the only metal they had to import was tin, which 
was imported from England [16]. Copper, iron, and lead 
were the most strategically significant raw materials. Most 
of the cannons of the army were cast of bronze, whose main 
raw material was copper. For small-caliber cannons, 
however, iron was the main ingredient. Iron was also 
needed for cannon balls, picks and axes used in digging 
trenches [34].  
 
 The Ottoman state had rich copper and iron deposits in 
its Balkan and Anatolian provinces. The Ottoman state had 
designed an elaborate supply chain by assigning the 
extraction and manufacture of specific materials to these 
provinces. Also, in times of need, it procured the necessary 
materials from civilian manufacturers and craftsmen [10]. 
 
 The Ottomans had a well-designed supply network for 
gunpowder production and cannon casting facilities. 
Gunpowder was supplied by İstanbul gunpowder works 
and sixteen others in Anatolia, Arab provinces, and the 
Balkans [34]. The main cannon casting facility also was in 
İstanbul, however, just like gunpowder works, they had 
seventeen cannon foundries in their territories. The 
scattered nature of these facilities created an advantage to 
the Ottomans; it greatly facilitated the fast deployment of 
military hardware in both the European theater and 
Anatolia and beyond [34]. These facilities were able to 
meet the needs of the army for hundreds of years. Ottomans 
also had the capability to cast cannons of intermediate size 
at the battlefield or nearby regional ateliers [12], [21]; this 
was their way of postponement of the production of 
weaponry.  
 The Ottomans had developed a wide variety of cannons, 
one of these was the first of its kind: mortars with parabolic 
trajectories. Historians agree that it was first used in the 
conquest of Constantinople to sink enemy ships in the 
Golden Horne [5], [21]. Some historians credit Mehmed II 
for the invention of the mortar. 
 
5. Logistics of the Ottoman Army 
 
5.1  Transportation 
 
Feeding thousands of soldiers and a variety of animals was 
one of the most critical tasks of the supply system of the 
Ottoman army. However, a much more critical task was 
delivering, not only food for soldiers and animals, but also 
all the weaponry and war related equipment such as 
gunpowder, siege equipment, cannons, and cannon balls, 
etc. The following quote gives an idea about the size of the 
army in a typical campaign that the supply and logistics 
systems of the army had to serve: 
 
“The campaign of Mehmed II against Uzun 
Hasan in 1473 mobilised 100,000 men-at-arms, 
a body of men which included 64,000 timariot 
sipahis, 12,000 Janissaries, 7,500 cavalry of the 
Porte, and 20,000 azabs. The central imperial  
budget dated 1528 numbered some 120,000-
150,000 members of the regular units, including 
38,000 provincial timar-holders, 20,000-60,000 
men-at arms brought to the campaigns by the 
timar-holders, and 47,000 mercenaries 
(including 24,000 members of the salaried 
troops of the Porte and 23,000 fortress guards, 
martalos and navy). These figures do not 
include the various auxiliary troops.” [12]. 
 
 Transportation of provisions, acquired through avarız, to 
menzilhanes and fortresses was the responsibility of the 
reaya. Transport of almost everything, such as additional 
food for men and animals, weapons, cannons, tents, siege 
equipment, etc. was mainly done by camels. Horses, mules, 
and carts pulled by oxen were also used but on a limited 
scale. There were several reasons for preferring camels. 
First of all, a camel can carry about 540 lbs. (250 kg.) while 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt   Vol. 9, No. 5, October 2020 
 
56 
a horse’s capacity is about 300 lbs. (136 kg.). Second, care 
and feeding of camels was less expensive. Third, each cart 
needed one driver, while a camel driver could manage six 
camels on the road. Finally, camels were able to traverse 
difficult terrain better than wagons. Without the camel, 
transportation costs would have been astronomical. 
 
 The Ottomans preferred to rent most of the camels they 
needed rather than owning them, because the cost of 
feeding and care, including the cost of their drivers, year 
around was much more than renting them for the duration 
of a campaign [10]. Each ten Janissaries were given a horse 
to carry their personal belongings [24]. 
 
 The Ottoman palace maintained a sufficient number of 
camels for transporting the sultan’s baggage. However, the 
army had to hire tens of thousands of camels and nomadic 
drivers for a campaign [17]. The following quote provides 
an idea about the number of camels needed for carrying 
animal food: 
 
“If we assume a daily minimum of 500 camel 
loads of grain to represent the average 
consumption of the mounts of that part of the army 
entitled to a supply from central stores, the 
carrying of provisions sufficient to last two to 
three months in the field implied the transport 
services of no fewer than 30,000 – perhaps as 
many as 50,000 – camels just to transport barley 
rations. (…) The troops’ own daily dietary 
requirements (…) required 105 camel loads for a 
force of 20,000 Janissary and Sipahi actives.” 
[12]. 
 
 Sea and river transportation was less expensive and was 
used whenever possible; Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the 
East and Danube and its tributaries in the West were used 
for transport [35]. “In the European theatre the Ottomans 
were favored by geography, since it was possible to make 
grain deliveries via the Danube waterway to within a few 
days’ march of any prospective front.” [12]. 
 
5.1.1  Roads and bridges 
 
Ottomans’ road system was partly inherited from Romans 
and Byzantines in the Balkans [15] and from Seljukids in 
Anatolia [12]. Months before the start of a campaign orders 
would go out to yayas, müsellems, and derbendcis in 
villages and towns on the march route to repair and 
maintain roads, bridges, and fortresses [10]. Derbendcis 
were farmers recruited for the tasks mentioned as well as 
the security of passages and menzilhanes; they were exempt 
from various taxes [21]. Cerahors were also tasked for 
opening and repairing roads, clearing forests, draining 
swamps, digging trenches, and transporting army’s 
equipment as well as performing various engineering works 
[1]. Other groups that helped with emergency road repair 
and guarding convoys and baggage trains were Yörüks 
(nomad Turks), Eflaks, Voynuks, Martoloses (Orthodox 
Christian militia) [10]. 
 
 Ottomans constructed permanent bridges on some of the 
main as well as secondary roads mostly for civilian use, 
however, only few of them were on march routes. Army 
often had to cross major and minor rivers on the march both 
in European (Danube and its many tributaries) and Asian 
lands (Euphrates and Tigris). River crossings were both 
difficult and risky. Ottoman army built pontoon bridges 
wide enough for three carts to pass for fast river crossings. 
These bridges would be disassembled and carried to the 
next river crossing [12]. For bridge construction the army 
needed about 500 architects and water engineers supported 
by about 250 infantrymen with tools [36].  
 
5.1.2  Cannons 
 
Ottoman army preferred transporting midsize and small 
cannons to battle field rather than very large ones. This was 
due to the difficulty of carrying them and the fact that they 
reduced the maneuverability and flexibility of army’s 
movements. They were transported to battle field only 
when there was a definite need for them.  
 
 Transportation of large cannons was the duty of top 
arabacıları [12]. They were also tasked to make the wagons 
and repair them. Another way cannons were made available 
at the front was to cast them when they were needed. Also, 
it should be recalled that the Ottomans had cannon casting 
facilities and gunpowder works in both the Balkans and 
eastern Anatolia. Their existence reduced the distance and 
time for transporting them to the front. Transporting heavy 
cannons and armaments was a challenge, therefore 
sometimes they were left at convenient storage places 
behind the front. This allowed the army a greater flexibility 
to advance quickly and engage the enemy when there was 
an opportunity [12]. 
 
6.  Marching and Halting 
 
The Ottomans started their march at the beginning of the 
growing season of crops and especially grass. Ottomans’ 
road system had three main routes in Europe and three in 
the East: Right, center, and left. All routes started in 
İstanbul for western campaigns and Üsküdar (on the 
Anatolian side), İstanbul for eastern campaigns. European 
right ended in Crimea; the center route in Belgrade, and the 
left in Adriatic and Morea. Eastern right ended in Mecca, 
the center in Baghdad and Basra, the left ended in Tabriz.  
 
 Halting points were selected before the start of a 
campaign. The most important criterion for the selection 
was the availability of drinkeable water. Also, menzilhanes 
or places close to them were preferred. Murphey estimated 
the pace of army march as 13.5 miles (22 km) per day; 
baggage trains’ pace behind the army, however, was 
estimated at 2 mph [12]. Marching during a campaign 
started very early before the sunrise and ended before the 
heat of the day took a toll on soldiers and animals; under 
normal conditions they would march about four and a half 
hours per day [12]. 
 
 Support troops would march ahead and pitch tents at the 
halting place for the sultan, commanders, and kapıkulu 
soldiers before their arrival. When the army took a break 
from the march, tents of various sizes would be pitched for 
sleeping, state treasury, bathing, latrine, praying, pantry, 
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kitchen, bakery, laundry, armaments, hospital, and 
executions [21]. The Ottomans paid great deal of attention 
to hygiene and cleanliness of its soldiers and camp sites. 
Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, ambassador of Habsburg 
Emperor Ferdinand I to the Ottoman Empire during the 
reign of Süleyman I, made the following observation at an 
army camp: 
 
“Moreover, there was the utmost cleanliness, no 
dungheaps or rubbish, nothing to offend the eyes 
or nose, everything of this kind being either 
buried by the Turks or else removed from sight. 
The men themselves dig a pit in the ground with 
their mattocks and burry all the excrement, and so 
keep the whole camp scrupulously clean. 
Moreover, you never see any drinking or revelry 
or any kind of gambling, which is such a serious 
vice amongst our soldiers, and so the Turks know 
nothing of the losses caused by cards and dice.” 
[37]. 
 
 All tents would be placed according to a well-designed 
pattern with the sultan’s tent in the center surrounded by the 
tents of grand vizier and commanders. Of course, all 
orducus, those who came with the army and orducus of the 
neighboring towns of the halting place, would have their 
tents and stalls set up in a separate area before the army’s 
arrival. Camp place would look like a market of a large city 
ready to meet almost any need of the soldiers. The types of 
artisans and tradesmen in orducus is just too long a list to 
give here. The following is a small fraction of them, a few 
of the expected and not so much expected ones: barbers, 
grocers, greengrocers, coffee makers, bakers, candle 
makers, butchers, spice sellers, fragrance sellers, fabric 
sellers, tailors, boot makers, shoemakers, saddlers, 
blacksmiths, and flea marketers.   
 
 One of the basic and favorite foods of the soldiers was 
bread; the importance of freshly baked bread for the 
soldiers cannot be overestimated. The Ottomans made sure 
that the soldiers would get freshly baked bread at halting 
places. This was accomplished by support troops marching 
ahead of the army and setting up mobile bakeries. However, 
army’s bakeries would not normally have the capacity to 
bake enough bread for all kapıkulu soldiers; the rest would 
be supplied by orducu bakers and from bakeries of nearby 
towns [33]. All soldiers could buy bread from orducu 
bakers. Also, cooks and butchers would be ready to prepare 
meals.  
 
 In addition to these, the army had its special support 
service groups, such as, doctors, surgeons, executioners, 
grave diggers, lağımcılar (miners, sappers), and sewer 
crews. Lağımcılar were indispensable at sieges, they would 
dig tunnels leading to the underbelly of fortress walls, place 
explosives and ignite them to destroy walls. They were also 
very skillful in building trenches. Another indispensable 
support troop was sakalar (water carriers); they distributed 
drinkable water to troops during march or at the battle 
ground. Sakalar also distributed water for bathing and 
laundry at halting points. They would fill their leather 
pouches from clean water sources, load them on their 
horses and walk around the troops and dispense water [21]. 
6.1 Mehteran (Mehter troops)  
 
A discussion of the supply chain and logistics system of the 
Ottoman Army would be incomplete without mentioning 
the mehteran or mehter bölüğü, Ottoman military marching 
band, also known as Janissary band in the West because it 
consisted mostly of Janissaries.  It is known as the oldest 
military band in the world, and it still exists, performing at 
ceremonies and special occasions. It was established very 
early during the reign of Osman Gazi. It can be considered 
as a moral support group to the army; they played martial 
music in battles, marches as well as in ceremonies. Their 
music was loud and exciting to get the adrenaline going, 
giving soldiers courage and strength of will, at the same 
time creating fear in enemy soldiers. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
Whether in defense of one’s country [38] or for conquest, 
the successful completion of a military campaign depends 
to a large extent how well it is planned, how well troops are 
trained, provisioned, and given the right weapons and tools. 
[39]. What is true today was also true during the time of this 
study. Historical events and records indicate that the 
Ottomans excelled in all of these; they had very efficient 
and effective supply and logistics systems. It didn’t mean 
they were successful in every campaign, but they were 
successful enough to conquer lands in three continents and 
became the most powerful empire during the time of this 
study.  
 
 An excellent example of how a superb supply and 
logistics system works with primitive technology was the 
conquest of Constantinople (İstanbul) in 1453. There had 
been numerous attempts to capture the city before, several 
times by the Ottomans, none was successful. The major 
reason was probably the almost indestructible and 
impenetrable fortifications of the city as well as the 
ineffectiveness of existing artillery technology. 
Preparations lasted more than two years, including building 
a fort on the European side of the Bosphorus across from 
the one on the Asian side to control navigation through the 
strait, and development and casting of a giant cannon with 
the aid of Hungarian engineer Orban. However, probably 
the most amazing supply and logistics achievement was 
moving about 70 ships over land and over a hill directly into 
the Golden Horn bypassing the chain barrier installed at the 
entrance. This was done in a very short time, by opening a 
passage through the forest, constructing a road of three 
miles, and dragging ships over logs oiled with animal fat 
and olive oil. Some sources mention that even sails of the 
ships were used to help the move [1]. It was a critical move 
in the siege of the city because the Byzantine fortifications 
on the Golden Horn side were the weakest, it also prevented 
any aid ships entering the inlet.  
 
 Most historians agree that in addition to well-trained 
soldiers, the supply chain and logistics systems of the army 
were the greatest factors in the success of the Ottomans in 
many campaigns. They also had most of the challenges of 
modern ones; so the question is “Can the modern supply 
chain and logistics systems and their managers learn 
anything from the Ottomans?” I believe the answer is “yes,” 
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it confirms that basic principles today’s excellent supply 
chains and logistics systems and their managers are using 
were the same in the Ottoman army. That is, advance 
planning, preparing for disruptions, clear communication, 
information sharing, hiring well educated and trained 
managers and members for the team, assigning them clear 
responsibilities, and rewarding good performance. Also, 
the Ottoman experience shows that great achievements are 
possible even with the use of primitive communication, 
supply, and transport technologies. So, it is possible to build 
and operate an effective and efficient supply chain and 
logistics systems even under adverse conditions; 
specifically, the failures of many modern supply and 
logistics systems in the time of Corona virus scourge of 
2019-2020 has shown that these systems still need a lot of 
improvements, preparedness, and resilience for  unknown 
unknowns [41]. 
 
 To the best of this author’s knowledge, there is very little 
research on the supply and logistics systems of armies and 
navies of other countries during the middle ages. What is 
presented in this paper may serve as an encouragement for 
others to study them. It also serves as a case for comparison 
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